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CHINA’S FOREIGN INVESTED PARTNERSHIP
ENTERPRISE LAW: THE LIFELESS OR SLEEPING
DRAGON?
Samuel H. Shaddox†
Abstract:
Investors and the Chinese government tout the March 2010
authorization of the Foreign Invested Partnership as an exciting new method for foreign
investment in China. However, this comment argues that the Foreign Invested
Partnership is not likely to become a vibrant short or long-term platform for foreign direct
investment. The historical trends of China’s three other vehicles for foreign direct
investment from 1979 to the present provide two key conclusions. First, foreign
investors will not utilize Foreign Invested Partnerships until they receive detailed
implementing regulations from China’s central government. Second, support or
restrictions from the Chinese government can drive or inhibit use of an investment
vehicle. China’s Foreign Invested Partnership lacks detailed regulations, and is also not
likely to receive them in the future because of increased involvement with local
authorities. Additionally, it is not likely to receive support from the Chinese government
because of lingering suspicions of the partnership enterprise and an ongoing political
transition. Because foreign investors will shy away from this unpredictability, the
Foreign Invested Partnership is not likely to be widely utilized in the short or long term.
The author recommends that Foreign Invested Partnership proponents overcome these
hurdles by pushing for detailed, favorable regulations for equity investment-focused
Foreign Invested Partnerships.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Partnerships were once commonplace in China.1 In fact, many
Chinese still refer to friends with full confidence in one another as a
friendship between Guan and Bao, a reference to a business partnership from
feudal times.2 During the middle of the twentieth century, partnerships fell
into complete disfavor with China’s socialized economy and were
essentially forgotten as a business entity.3
After slowly easing restrictions on domestic partnerships during the
last fifteen years,4 China authorized the Foreign Invested Partnership (“FIP”)
†
Juris Doctor expected in 2013, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like
to thank the editors of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal and note that any errors are solely his
responsibility.
1
Fang Liufang, Chinese Partnership, 52(3) LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 43–47 (Xia Yuantao,
Sang Binxue & Danian Zhang trans., 1989).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
JAMES ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE TO FOREIGN INVESTED
ENTERPRISES 92–105 (3d ed. 2010).
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in March of 2010. Authoritative texts hail FIP as a promising development
for foreign investors.5 According to the Chinese government, the law was
designed to “build . . . a friendly environment for foreign companies and
individuals [for] establishing partnership enterprises in China.”6
Foreign direct investment has grown remarkably since China opened
to it in 1979.7 During the 1980s investment in China grew at an annual rate
of about $1.6 billion USD before accelerating rapidly during the 1990s and
2000s.8 During the first six months of 2012, China received $59 billion in
investments, making it the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct
investment, while the United States, the second largest recipient, received
$57.4 billion.9
However, foreign direct investment in China has fallen over the past
year, a trend that analysts expect will continue at a much greater rate during
the next year.10 In response to this decline, the Chinese government has
taken numerous measures to reverse the trend.11 Left undefined is the role
FIP will play within this recovery.
The FIP joins three pre-existing foreign direct investment vehicles:
the equity joint venture (“EJV”), authorized in 1979;12 the wholly foreignowned enterprise (“WFOE”), authorized in 1986;13 and the cooperative joint
venture (“CJV”), authorized in 1988.14 During the past thirty years, the
percent-share of foreign direct investment between EJV, CJV, and WFOE
has changed dramatically.15 The recent approval of FIP makes it a natural
vehicle for China to seek increased amounts of foreign direct investment.

5

Id. at 92–111.
Laney Zhang, China: Rules on Foreign Invested Partnerships, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Dec. 7,
2009), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205401719_text.
7
See K.C. FUNG, LAWRENCE J. LAU & JOSEPH S. LEE, U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA 42–47
(2004) (chronicling the growth of foreign direct investment after 1979).
8
VAI IO LO & XIAOWEN TIAN, LAW AND INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE LEGAL AND BUSINESS
ENVIRONMENTS AFTER WTO ACCESSION 100 (2005).
9
Jack Perkowski, China Leads in Foreign Direct Investment, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jackperkowski/2012/11/05/china-leads-in-foreign-direct-investment.
10
China Foreign Investment Falls for 11th Time in 12 Months, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 19, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-20/china-foreign-direct-investment-falls-for-11th-time-in-12months.html.
11
China to ‘simplify’ procedures for foreign investors, BBC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20440206.
12
JUN FU, INSTITUTIONS AND INVESTMENTS: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA DURING AN
ERA OF REFORMS 27 (2000).
13
Id. at 48.
14
PHILLIP DONALD GRUB & JIAN HAI LIN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA 67 (1991).
15
FU, supra note 12, at 10.
6
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However, this comment argues that it is unlikely that a significant
number of foreign investors will be interested in playing out a modern day
Guan and Bao through the formation of an FIP. Part II of this comment
analyzes China’s foreign direct investment patterns and concludes that FIP
utilization by foreign investors will depend on authorization by the
government of detailed implementing regulations.
Additionally, the
historical trends indicate that FIP will fail if the Chinese government does
not provide support. Part III of this comment argues that FIP is unlikely to
receive detailed implementing regulations, which will limit its adoption with
foreign investors. Similarly, China’s historical suspicion of partnerships and
an ongoing political transition suggest FIP will not receive government
support. Part IV concludes that FIP’s best chance of becoming a vibrant
investment vehicle is through development of detailed implementing
regulations for a specific category of foreign direct investment: equity
investments.
II.

THE FIP IS BORN

In 2007, the Chinese government stated that rules regarding FIPs
would be issued at a future date by the State Council.16 In considering
authorization of FIP, the government faced an important challenge. Were
they to make FIP too advantageous as an investment vehicle, large-scale
abandonment of the other foreign direct investment vehicles could ensue.17
But of course, FIP had to include some advantages over other investment
vehicles or foreign investors would not utilize it.18
Between 2007, when the Chinese government indicated that rules
regarding FIP were forthcoming and the 2009 authorization, the government
considered two potential FIP laws. The first was created by the Ministry of
Commerce and was highly restrictive.19 It required central approval for both
levels of capital investment and all amendments to partnership agreements.20
The second model, authored by the State Council Legislative Affairs Office,

16
Partnership Enterprise Law of the People’s Republic of China, ch. VI, art. 108 (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007),
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/P020061018643910006
967.pdf.
17
Wei Cui, Will Partnership Law Be Worth It?, 27 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 30 (2008).
18
Id. at 31.
19
Id. at 30.
20
Id.
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was less restrictive; it did not have any limits on capital structure and did not
require approval of changes in partnership structure.21
The law adopted by the government was more restrictive because it
required an application for and approval of any changes in the partnership
structure of the firm.22 As one commentator notes, this requirement throws
the essence of a partnership “out the window” by requiring that the
government itself be an indispensable partner and giving it the final say in
any major partnership decision.23
China tempered this considerable limitation by providing several
incentives for foreign investors. First, it did not require an initial capital
investment or subsequent modification within the FIP regulations beyond the
general foreign investment enterprise requirement of thirty-thousand RMB.24
Additionally, other foreign investment enterprises have required registered
capital, normally $100,000 USD, depending on the business plan, fifteen
percent of which must be contributed within three months of the business
license issuance, and the remainder within two years.25 An FIP does not
have to meet either of these requirements.26 In addition, foreign investors
have the ability to better control investments with Chinese partners in an FIP
than in a joint venture.27
The FIP has several other advantages that foreign investors should
consider. First, an FIP, unlike other foreign investment enterprises, is not
required to publicly announce its formation, provide guarantees to investors,
or acquire approval from the government when decreasing capital.28
Second, unlike the other foreign investment enterprises, an FIP is not
required to make up for accumulated losses or allocate reserve funds from its
profit until the statutory reserve fund reaches fifty percent of the foreign
21

Id.
See Administrative Provisions on the Registration of Foreign Invested Partnership Enterprises
Decree of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, No. 47, ch. 3, arts. 21–30 (promulgated by
the State Admin. for Indus. & Commerce, Jan. 29, 2010, effective Mar. 1, 2010) (China), translated in
24(3) CHINA L. & PRAC. 41–42 (Apr. 2010).
23
Cui, supra note 17, at 30.
24
See Administrative Provisions on the Registration of Foreign Invested Partnership Enterprises
Decree of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, No. 47, ch. 2–3 (promulgated by the State
Admin. for Indus. & Commerce, Jan. 29, 2010, effective Mar. 1, 2010) (China), translated in 24(3) CHINA
L. & PRAC. 41–42 (Apr. 2010).
25
China’s Latest Partnership Investment Vehicle for Foreign Investors, SALANS,
http://www.salans.com/~/media/Assets/Salans/Publications/1006%20Salans%20Foreign%20Invested%20P
artnership%20Enterprise%20Alert%20En.ashx (last visited Dec. 18, 2011).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
22
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investment enterprise’s capital.29 Third, unlike CJVs or EJVs, which
prevent complete foreign control because of their governance structures,
FIPs may designate its Chinese partners as limited partners, which results in
greater control for the foreign investor.30
In addition to its benefits, FIP is also subject to many of the
limitations common amongst other foreign investment enterprises. These
limitations are applied more strictly against FIP. Like all forms of foreign
investment enterprise, FIP is governed by the 2012 Foreign Investment
Industrial Guidance Catalogue (“Catalogue”).31 The Catalogue has three
different categories: encouraged, restricted, and prohibited.32 These are
defined according to industry fields and subcategories within each
industry.33 The Catalogue is especially limiting regarding FIP, prohibiting
its use in 1) any industry prohibited to foreigners, 2) any industry which is
open to only EJVs and CJVs, 3) any industry which is only open to a project
with either absolute or relative controlling Chinese shareholders, and 4) any
industry which requires a specific shareholding ratio of foreign investors in a
project.34 This indicates that the Chinese government intends to more
severely limit FIP vis-à-vis other vehicles for foreign direct investment.
Compounding these restrictions is an absence of detailed
implementing regulations for FIP. Investors have universally called for the
development of regulations that will provide foreign investors with an
understanding of the regulatory treatment of FIP.35 Nevertheless, language
from a 1990 analysis of the legal framework for foreign investments remains
accurate concerning the new FIP law and regulations: the “[l]aws and
regulations are couched in broad, ambiguous and sometimes conflicting
terms, leaving local or central implementing agencies a wide scope for
29

Id.
Id.
31
See Administrative Provisions on the Registration of Foreign Invested Partnership Enterprises
Decree of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, No. 47 (promulgated by the State Admin.
for Indus. & Commerce, Jan. 29, 2010, effective Mar. 1, 2010) (China), translated in 24(3) CHINA L. &
PRAC. 41–42 (Apr. 2010); Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (Amended 2011),
Decree of the State Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s
Republic of China, No. 57, ch. 1, art. 3 (promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 31, 2007, effective Dec. 1,
2007).
32
Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (Amended 2011), Decree of the State
Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, No.
57 (promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 31, 2007, effective Dec. 1, 2007).
33
Id.
34
China’s Latest Partnership Investment Vehicle for Foreign Investors, supra note 25, at 5.
35
Id. at 12; Alan Wang & Chen Yong, Foreign-invested Partnership Regulations: Radical Reform
or Unmet Expectations?, 24(1) CHINA L. & PRAC. 17 (Feb. 2010).
30
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interpretation and leading to inconsistent treatment.”36 Foreign investors
seek a determinacy that Chinese regulation has consistently refused to give
FIP.
The FIP law lacks detailed implementing regulations and appears to
be restricted by the Chinese government. In order to determine the
significance of these two factors, this comment analyzes the impact of vague
regulations and government support on the other three modes of foreign
direct investment in China.
III.

THE DIFFICULT PATH OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES IN CHINA
INDICATES TROUBLE FOR FIP

In 1978, China adopted the open door policy that invited substantial
foreign participation and investment in its economy for the first time since
the Chinese civil war.37 Over the following thirty years, China implemented
three principal foreign investment enterprises in an effort to secure foreign
direct investment, complete with a body of law distinct from existing
domestic rules.38 The history of these previously enacted foreign investment
enterprises indicate that FIP will have difficulty becoming a viable direct
investment platform for western investors.
The first approved method of foreign direct investment was equity
joint venture (“EJV”) which was officially authorized on July 8, 1979.39
Typically, an EJV is a limited liability company established by two or more
partners in which parties are liable for losses and share profits according to
their respective equity interest.40 This fixed, inflexible ratio of profit and
loss sharing between the partners is the defining characteristic of EJV.41
36
Zafar Khan, Patterns of Direct Foreign Investment in China, 120 WORLD BANK DISCUSSION
PAPERS 27 (1991).
37
FENG LI & JING LI, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA 5 (1999).
38
WILLIAM B. GAMBLE, INVESTING IN CHINA: LEGAL, FINANCIAL AND REGULATORY RISK 155
(2002).
39
Xiaoguang Zhang, Foreign Investment Policy, Contribution and Performance, in FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA 11, 13 (Yanrui Wu ed., 1999); LI & LI, supra note 37, at
54.
40
See Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures, Order
of the President of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Oct. 31, 2000, effective Oct. 31, 2000), available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_
en_info.jsp?docid=51032. For a detailed description of the Cooperative Joint Venture in China, please
refer to ZIMMERMAN, supra note 4.
41
Zhou Ziya, A Comparative Study of Three Kinds of Enterprise Involving Foreign Investment in
China, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 110-11 (William
Tai ed., China Trade trans., 1988).
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China next authorized wholly foreign-owned enterprise (“WFOE”) in
1986. An WFOE is a limited liability company that is one-hundred percent
foreign-owned in which a foreign party’s liability is limited to its contributed
investment.42 Accordingly, the largest advantage of a WFOE is the ability of
the foreign party to manage and operate the enterprise as desired, without the
involvement of a Chinese partner.43 The lack of a Chinese partner, however,
can be a disadvantage because it increases the importance of the foreign
entity’s familiarity with Chinese culture and business practices.44
China approved the cooperative joint venture (“CJV”) through formal
legislation in April of 1988.45 It is also known as the “contractual joint
venture”46 because the main terms and conditions of cooperation are
established in the joint venture contract itself.47 Therefore, a CJV, unlike an
EJV, does not require investment partners to assume risk or share profits
according to their respective capital contribution.48 Instead, risk and profit
ratios are established in the initial contract between the parties.49
A.

Existing Foreign Investment Enterprises Struggled Initially Because
of Regulatory Uncertainty

Historic foreign direct investment trends in China indicate that FIP
needs detailed implementing regulations before foreign investors will widely
adopt it. Each of the precursor investment vehicles floundered in the years
between their adoption and government regulation. Without the Chinese
government clearly indicating the limitations of an investment method,
foreign investors were essentially asked to take on substantial risk and hope
legal challenges were not forthcoming. The 1979 approval of EJV
established a pattern of authorizing laws that speak only in very broad terms

42
43
44

(1998).

ZIMMERMAN, supra note 4, at 85.
GRUB & LIN, supra note 14, at 72.
HAISHUN SUN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA: 1979–1996 51

45
See PRC, Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law (Promulgated by the Nat. People’s Cong.,
Apr. 13, 1988), translated in 2(4) CHINA L. & PRAC. 41–42 (May 1988).
46
Lutz-Christian Wolff China’s Private International Investment Law: One-Way Street into PRC
Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 1039, 1042 (2008) (citing Clark T. Randt Jr., Joint Ventures, in DOING BUSINESS
IN CHINA 1–3, § 2.02 [4]; OWEN D. NEE JR., SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS AND JOINT VENTURES IN CHINA
65 (2005).
47
Wolff, supra note 46, at 1042.
48
YUWA WEI, INVESTING IN CHINA 74–76 (2000).
49
GRUB & LIN, supra note 14, at 67.
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regarding the enterprises they legalize.50 The 1979 act is best viewed as an
“enabling act, leaving specific details and programs to be worked out either
in regulations or the joint venture documents.”51 The act was simply a three
page authorizing statute without any specific provisions, regulations, or
guidelines for implementation.52 The simple, limited nature of the enabling
act for EJV contributed to low utilization rates, but implementing regulations
were not issued until four years later.53
Similarly, China approved WFOE in April of 1986, but it was again
merely an authorizing law.54 The lack of implementing regulations placed
one-hundred percent of WFOE risk creation on the foreign investor, who
was forced to guess whether an investment would run into legal challenges.55
Yet, China took two years to issue detailed implementing regulations for
WFOE.56
The CJV faced similar regulatory uncertainty. When it was
authorized in 1988, its viability was limited, especially for multinational
companies that, as a matter of practice, required certainty and predictability
to make large investments.57 Despite the need to ameliorate CJV’s lack of
certainty and predictability, China’s government did not issue detailed
regulations until seven years after CJV’s initial approval.58
The FIP is following a similar pattern to EJV, WFOE, and CJV. It
lacks detailed implementing regulations. This deficiency, similar to those
investment vehicles, will likely contribute to low utilization rates by foreign
investors.

50

Eileen Golden, People’s Republic of China–1983 Joint Venture Implementing Regulations–The
Supplement of Detail, In An Attempt to Attract Foreign Investment, 15 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 389, 393
(1985) (noting that the initial approval of the EJV lacked accompanying specific regulations).
51
William Alford & David Birenbaum, Ventures in the China Trade: An Analysis of China’s
Emerging Legal Framework for the Regulation of Foreign Investment, 3 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 56, 71–72
(1981).
52
Id.
53
Crawford Brickley, Equity Joint Ventures in the People’s Republic of China: The Promised Land
Not Yet in Sight for Foreign Investors, 10 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 257, 260 (1988).
54
Z.Y. James Fang & David K.Y. Tang, The Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law: Defining the
Legislative History and Interpreting the Statute, 2 J. CHINESE L. 153, 153 (1988).
55
GRUB & LIN, supra note 14, at 80.
56
See
Foreign
Direct
Investment
in
China,
U.S.–CHINA
BUS.
COUNCIL,
http://www.uschina.org/statistics/fdi_cumulative.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2012) (showing that WFOE
utilization by foreign investors accelerated after promulgation of implementation regulations).
57
Editors’ Notes, 9(9) CHINA L. & PRAC. 32, 32 (1995).
58
KUI HUA WANG, CHINESE COMMERCIAL LAW 115 (2000).
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Government Support Was a Significant Contributor to the Relative
Success of EJV, WFOE, and CJV

Government support and regulation of EJV, WFOE, and CJV
determined the degree to which investors utilize them. EJV flourished under
substantial government backing, while both WFOE and CJV were hampered
by excessive restrictions. The fate of FIP will similarly be determined by
the balance between government support and regulation.
The presence of government support is even more critical when one
considers that written laws and regulations often diverge substantially from
how they are applied.59 A governmental agency can trump any right
guaranteed to a corporation by the law and the Constitution.60 The
Communist Party in China drives part of the divergence between written and
applied laws, creating changes that are frequent and substantial enough to
effectively repeal existing laws.61 For example, a local government can
require a corporation to submit a monetary contribution that is expressly
prohibited by law.62 In this example, the foreign investor would have to
cope with unexpected costs and might be deterred from continuing the
investment. Yet variance from written laws cuts both ways, as government
agencies often choose not to enforce laws unfriendly to certain forms of
foreign investment, especially in the case of local governments seeking
capital.63
China’s inconsistent treatment of foreign investors is also guided by
market concerns. For example, China implemented an austerity program in
1989 and 1990 that resulted in massive losses for foreign investment firms
and strong government pressure against certain business practices that the
government had previously guaranteed as protected.64 The result was that
many joint venture firms scaled back production considerably.65
It is clear that the Chinese government can essentially control, through
its own preferences, the success or failure of a given investment vehicle
through both official and unofficial means. Government support was a
59
Anyuan Yuan, Foreign Direct Investment in China–Practical Problems of Complying with
China’s Company Law and Laws for Foreign-Invested Enterprises, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 475, 482
(2000).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
GRUB & LIN, supra note 14, at 91.
65
Id. at 209.
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critical factor in the relative historical utilization of EJV, WFOE, and CJV
by foreign investors.
During the first four years following approval of EJV, only eightynine joint ventures were approved.66 This led the Chinese government to
make significant revisions to EJV in 1983 with the goals of “enabl[ing] the
existing Chinese-foreign joint ventures to be run more successfully and . . .
attract[ing] more foreign investors . . . to establish new joint ventures.”67
Notably, the purpose of these modifications was not to make the economy
more liberal, but simply to clarify the existing regulations in order to
encourage greater confidence amongst foreign investors.68 The revised
regulations provided detailed rules regarding organizational governance,
registration, capitalization, management, taxation, and labor relations.69
As a result, foreign firms grew more interested in EJV in China.70
Approved EJVs spiked to 279 between January 1983 and June 1984, and
totaled 741 for 1984.71 Yet, by 1986 foreign investment in China had
dropped precipitously due to widespread recognition of legal difficulties,
again disappointing both foreign investors and China’s government.72 In
1990, reacting to foreign investors’ skepticism, China amended the joint
venture law.73 Most importantly, China eased onerous regulations that
severely restricted the ability of a foreign investor to control a joint
venture.74 China also relaxed restrictions on the life span of joint ventures
and the ability of foreign ventures to swap foreign exchange currencies
among themselves.75 After these modifications, EJV became the most
utilized and prominent form of direct investment in China.76 EJV remains
popular because it has the longest track record (in terms of development and
interpretation) of any foreign investment enterprise, offering an important
measure of predictability.77
66

Brickley, supra note 53.
MARGARET PEARSON, JOINT VENTURES IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: THE CONTROL OF
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT UNDER SOCIALISM 73 (1991) (quoting Yuan Mu, State Council spokesman
(1983)).
68
Id.
69
See Golden, supra note 50, at 391-401.
70
LI & LI, supra note 37, at 60.
71
Id.
72
Brickley, supra note 53, at 260-62.
73
Zhang, supra note 39, at 15; Barbara Potter, China’s Equity Joint Venture Law: A Standing
Invitation to the West for Foreign Investment?, 14 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 1, 27 (1993–94).
74
Zhang, supra note 39, at 15.
75
Id. at 15–16.
76
Khan, supra note 36, at 36 (noting general investment patterns generally).
77
Clark T. Randt, Jr., Joint Ventures, in 2 DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA II-2.1, § 2.02[2] (Michael J.
Moser & Fu Yu eds., 2011).
67
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Despite its evolution, investors have increasingly turned away from
EJV and relied more heavily on WFOE for five reasons. First, many high
profile joint ventures failed due to partnerships with inefficient and large
PRC state enterprises.78 Second, cultural differences sometimes resulted in
the Chinese partner failing to act as expected.79 Third, some foreign
investors failed to select appropriate Chinese entities and partners for their
investments.80 Fourth, EJV regulations required technology transfers
between the foreign entity and Chinese partner, which threatened to
compromise foreign investors’ trade secrets.81 And finally, over time
investors grew more comfortable investing without a Chinese partner.82
Many of the reasons that led investors away from EJV will also deter foreign
investors from an FIP with a Chinese partner.
The WFOE, in contrast to EJV, was not initially favored by China
after it was approved in 1986.83 The Chinese government barred WFOEs
from certain industries and severely limited domestic sales of WFOE
products. 84 China did not prefer WFOE because of a direct conflict with the
socialist principle of public ownership.85 Additionally, unlike joint ventures,
in a WFOE there is no Chinese partner that benefits from foreign expertise
and capital.86
Yet, over time China eased key WFOE restrictions. Important to the
deregulation trend were the positive policy changes by the Chinese
government, including removing unfavorable WFOE-specific tax
provisions.87 In 2001, additional barriers were removed as part of China’s
ascension to WTO membership.88 This external pressure helped build even
further momentum for WFOE.89 WFOE’s share of foreign investment
enterprises increased from approximately ten percent in the late 1980s, to
fifty percent by 2000, to almost eighty percent today.90
78

GAMBLE, supra note 38, at 158.
Id.
80
Id.
81
WANG, supra note 58, at 130.
82
Randall Peerenboom, Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises, in 2 DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA II-3.2, §
3.01 (Michael J. Moser & Fu Yu eds., 2011).
83
See Potter, supra note 73, at 13.
84
Zhang Lixing, The Statutory Framework for Direct Foreign Investment in China, 4 FLA. INT’L L.J.
289, 293 (1988–1989).
85
Fang & Tang, supra note 54, at 156-57.
86
See Potter, supra note 73, at 13.
87
SUN, supra note 44, at 23.
88
Wolff, supra note 46, at 1043.
89
David Boitout & Bastien Trelcat, The Pros and Cons of Joint Ventures, 25 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 87,
87 (2006).
90
FUNG, LAU & LEE, supra note 7, at 48; Foreign Direct Investment in China, supra note 56.
79
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In contrast to WFOE’s mounting support, the Chinese government has
not backed CJV. CJV was developed by investors as a response to
restrictions placed by China on EJV.91 Its three comparative advantages
were 1) no requirement of substantial investment by the Chinese partner, 2)
flexible profit disbursement that allowed for reinvestment of capital, and 3)
investment certainty for both the Chinese and foreign investor.92 Prior to the
1988 approval of CJVs, it was already more popular than EJV: over fivethousand similar arrangements had been approved without the official legal
framework.93
Following the Chinese government’s initial approval in 1988,
commentators were optimistic that CJV would become the dominant
Chinese foreign investment enterprise:
It has been proved in practice that Chinese-foreign cooperative
ventures, as compared with Chinese-foreign joint ventures, are
more flexible, more suitable for the conditions of China, where
both capital and technology are inadequate, and they embody
more favourable terms and conditions for foreign investors.
Therefore, they are readily accepted by Chinese and foreign
parties and have become the best way to introduce and make
use of foreign capital in China.94
Having noted these advantages, Zhang Jielin, author of the above quoted
passage and then-deputy director of the Institute of Legal Research for the
Academy of Social Sciences of Guangdong Province, concluded that the
central government needed to pass laws and regulations necessary to provide
predictability in order for CJV to become a vibrant foreign investment
enterprise.95 As noted above, it took Beijing seven years to provide this
framework.96 Ambiguities in the 1995 Rules were subsequently addressed
with another regulatory update in October of 1996.97
Even after the development of detailed regulations, CJV continues to
decrease in popularity as an investment vehicle, primarily because it lacks a
91
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“clear and independent legal form” and receives less favorable policy
treatment from China–including outright refusal by Beijing to implement
certain key CJV features.98 For example, the initial regulatory provisions for
CJVs had more stringent requirements than EJVs.99 The lack of regulatory
promulgation following CJV authorization was also problematic, causing
confusion regarding foreign investors’ rights, benefits, and obligations.100
As a result, CJVs have fallen almost completely out of favor with foreign
investors; in 2010, only three-hundred of the 27,406 foreign investment
enterprise projects were CJVs, or just over one percent.101 At their peak
during the 1980s, CJVs accounted for nearly fifty percent of the foreign
investment enterprise projects in China.102
The CJV remains a viable option primarily for those from cultures
closely related to China, because, lacking a clear and independent legal
form, it requires comfort and a working familiarity with Chinese culture and
laws.103 Accordingly, foreign investors from Hong Kong (pre-integration)
utilized the CJV at a greater rate than investors with greater sociocultural
differences with China.104
In reviewing the path of EJV, WFOE, and CJV, it is apparent that
government support played a critical role in their development. Government
support will similarly have a substantial impact on whether FIP is widely
utilized by foreign investors.
IV.

THE FIP ENTERPRISE IS NOT LIKELY
INVESTORS

TO BE

WIDELY UTILIZED

BY

Two pre-eminent scholars, Lieberthal and Oksenberg, found that
policy-making in China is a highly fragmented process that requires systemwide active cooperation among bureaucrats.105 This has three important
implications for the development of sufficiently detailed FIP implementation
regulations. First, the need for detailed implementing regulations must be
pushed to the central government by interested stakeholders (e.g., foreign
investors and provincial authorities), where high-level political actors can
98
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both coordinate a response and bring together interested parties.106 Second,
any fragmentation of authority requires strenuous efforts to maintain the
consensus necessary to move forward.107 And finally, any proposed policy
requires the attention and support of at least one top political leader.108
The FIP is unlikely to meet the second and third conditions of these
policymaking requirements. Additionally, FIP is not likely to receive
detailed implementing regulations because of its uniquely devolved approval
process. Similarly, FIP is not likely to receive government support because
of lingering resentment of the partnership entity and the ongoing political
transition in China.
A.

Decentralized Authority for FIP Approval Will Likely Hamper the
Promulgation of a Detailed Regulatory Platform

Foreign investment is driven by two basic factors: the safety of the
investment and the opportunity for profit.109 China’s lack of regulatory
clarity has been a constant deterrent to investors, who have called attention
to it repeatedly, going so far as to call it the “foremost issue” for foreign
direct investment in China.110 One unique aspect of FIP is its reliance on
Some
provincial, rather than national authorities for approval.111
commentators have even suggested that this devolution might be an
important step towards systemic deregulation of foreign investments.112
Devolution of FIP approval has some potential benefits for foreign investors,
but as a whole, will hinder the development of FIP as a viable foreign
investment enterprise by making the development of detailed implementing
regulations unlikely.
It is important to first note the potential benefits of devolved approval
for FIP.
Central approval from China’s Ministry of Commerce
(“MOFCOM”)113 for other foreign investment enterprises typically takes
around three months and can be much longer depending on the proposed
investment.114 Accordingly, establishment of a foreign investment enterprise
106
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other than an FIP is a “time consuming, multi-step, and often expensive
process involving various government agencies.”115 A devolved approval
process for FIPs should be much shorter, as the state authority is able to
register FIPs upon application, and is strongly encouraged to make the
decision within twenty days for most FIPs.116 However, if necessary, an FIP
must obtain relevant licenses or permits for specific businesses prior to
enjoying this accelerated timeline.117
A streamlined and local approval process also presents a significant
disadvantage. Foreign investors will likely struggle to navigate the
inconsistent practices of many local authorities.118 The devolved process
will result in decreased predictability and necessitate greater reliance on
informal discussions at the local level between investors and authorities to
ensure approval and compliance.119
Some commentators are highly skeptical that devolved authority will
lead to new investment opportunities and argue instead that it will increase
uncertainty by presenting local investment opportunities that conflict with
existing regimes.120 For example, because minimum capital requirements
for FIPs are not specified by law, these requirements will likely be
developed through practice,121 which, developed at the local level,
introduces more unpredictability for foreign firms that will have to balance
substantial regional differences. Elevating provincial authorities in the
regulatory process is therefore likely to further obfuscate an already opaque
process while introducing a much more difficult environment for effective
informal contact by requiring the foreign investors to develop new
relationships with provincial authorities.
The devolved FIP approval process is also likely to negatively impact
the national development of detailed implementing regulations.122
Decentralization of foreign investment policies can impede development of
115
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regulations. In the late 1970s, decentralization increased the capacity of
localities to resist the central government’s priorities, leading to conflict.123
Similarly, in the 1980s, investors had to watch as localities repeatedly
frustrated the policies of upper level authorities.124 For example, differing
local preferences were partially to blame for China’s failed national priority
to procure investment in the energy and transportation fields.125 During this
time, localities and Special Economic Zones were given authority to approve
certain joint ventures valued at less than either $10 or $30 million.126 Yet,
local preferences for profitability led to the approval of projects that clashed
with national priorities, eventually leading to recentralization.127
This tension between localities and the central government
demonstrates the importance of cooperation between officials when
attempting decentralization, as both have the capacity to hinder the new
policy.128 FIP, with its local authorization, will face a similar struggle
because it is a new form of foreign direct investment and an unprecedented
shift toward decentralization.
The FIP also faces a much more fractured policymaking environment
in comparison to the one in which the government refined EJV and WFOE
laws to make them more attractive to foreign investors. Numerous interest
groups with significant sway have created a contentious atmosphere and are
forcing the government to balance conflicting goals.129 Policymaking is
much more difficult without central authority over the drafting of
legislation.130 Still, China’s economic control of the planning system has
largely been abandoned.131 Implementation of detailed implementing
regulations for FIP is thus more difficult now than it has been for past
foreign investment vehicles such as EJV and WFOE.
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The Chinese Government Is Unlikely to Support FIP Because of
Lingering Suspicions of Private Enterprise and Partnerships

The 2010 authorization of FIP enterprises is an additional step that
was built on previous decisions concerning partnerships generally. This
history will likely have a substantial negative impact on the continued
development of the legal and regulatory framework of FIPs.
As indicated by the feudal partnership of Guan and Bao, partnerships
were common in China prior to the 1949 revolution.132 However, China’s
emphasis on socialist centralization of the economy and complete
government control following the Communist Party’s takeover meant that
partnerships mostly disappeared at the end of the 1950s until the 1980s.133
The communist government’s shunning of partnerships continued to
prevail after China emerged from political and economic isolation and began
liberalizing its economy in 1979. Many business organizations with
elements of partnerships were legalized, yet they were based in existing
economic regulations and the label of “partnership” was intentionally
avoided so as to not give an appearance of capitalism or privatization.134
Accordingly, an entire generation of Chinese technocrats views capitalism
and privatization with suspicion.135
This suspicion manifested in the refusal of China’s leaders to approve
partnerships within until 1997.136 Even then, the 1997 authorization was
only for general partnerships, in which partners have unlimited joint and
several liability.137 This led to the initial partnership authorization receiving
limited attention.138 Yet, it was not until 2007 that limited liability
partnerships were authorized.139 This finally allowed limited partners to be
liable exclusively for debts to the extent of their capital contribution, similar
to an EJV.140
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China’s strained history with the partnership enterprise is likely to
detrimentally influence further development of FIPs. It is probable that of
the three existing foreign investment enterprises, FIPs will most closely
resemble CJVs, which has fallen into relative disuse because of the
restrictions placed on it by the Chinese government.141
C.

The 2012 Political Transition Decreases the Probability That FIP
Will Be Further Developed in the Short Term

The current transfer of political leadership from President Hu Jintao,
to Vice President Xi Jinping142 may also significantly impede the
development of detailed FIP regulations or government support for FIPs.
Changes in China’s leadership, no matter how subtle, make a substantial
difference because of the divergent developmental strategies and policies
preferred by each politician.143 The impending change of leadership has
already exposed disagreement between Chinese leaders over economic
priorities, including the role of investment in the domestic economy.144
A similar transfer of political power at the top of the Communist Party
in the 1980s, was a leading factor in the Chinese government’s inability to
secure investment in energy-related fields.145 The next generation of
politicians in China is likely to “bring fresh ideas, insights, and a rich range
of experience to the pinnacle of China’s governance.”146 It is unclear
whether FIP, promulgated by outgoing leaders, will be given the attention
necessary to succeed as an investment vehicle.
A natural response to this critique is to acknowledge that China has
progressed beyond such uncertainty in its past. After all, since China’s
opening to the outside world, several thousand pieces of legislation on
foreign-related trade and investment in China were promulgated and
implemented,147 suggesting a more stable environment.
But predictable economic development is anything but certain. Even
with this existing body of regulations, it would be a mistake to assume that
141
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foreign investments, especially in an entirely new platform like FIP, will be
developed with the degree of consistency that is expected of other global
economy-influencing countries. As The Economist notes in describing
China:
Too many Westerners . . . assume they are dealing with a selfconfident, rational power that has come of age. Think instead
of a paranoid, introspective imperial court, already struggling
with subjects and now embarking on a slightly awkward
succession.148
This characterization, while meant for a decidedly western audience,
finds support in atypical decisions made by the Chinese government. For
example, the ongoing political transition influenced China’s decision to
issue regulations that punish television programs that are too entertaining
because of a perceived subversive effect.149 If China is nervous about
television being too entertaining, it is hard to reliably predict how FIPs will
be treated.
The capacity for economic upheaval and reprioritization is likely
burnished by the different political outlook of China’s incoming politicians,
who are more open to political reform than outgoing leaders.150 Considering
that FIP is likely to continue to struggle without sufficient regulatory
specificity,151 it is unlikely that, during a period of remarkable political
transition, FIP will be given the support and resources necessary to become a
widely utilized foreign investment enterprise.
V.

THE FIP CAN STILL SUCCEED THROUGH PROMULGATION OF DETAILED
REGULATIONS FOR EQUITY INVESTMENTS

In order to become an effective foreign direct investment enterprise,
several legal changes to FIP law are necessary. Because implementing these
changes will be difficult in China’s fractured policy making environment,
148
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China should instead focus on developing FIP for private equity funds and
investments, a smaller category of foreign direct investment.
A.

China Should Build a Comprehensive FIP Regulatory Regime For
Private Equity Funds

Implementing regulations for FIPs that will have equity investment as
a main business are notably lacking. FIP regulations themselves simply note
that “[w]here a foreign-invested partnership, the main business of which is
investment, makes an investment in China, matters shall be handled in
accordance with relevant state laws, administrative regulations, and rule on
foreign investment.”152 This reliance on existing laws is unfortunate, as
foreign investors hoped that FIP laws would finally open this nascent area to
foreign direct investment.153 FIPs in this sector would attract both local and
foreign investors, enjoy tax-transparency, and be able to make investments
at will, without having to go through foreign authorities.154
The only possible pre-existing state law on this subject is the
Administration of Foreign-Invested Venture Capital Enterprise
Provisions.155 These administrative provisions, promulgated in 2003,
predate not only FIP law (by nearly a decade), but also law authorizing
domestic limited Chinese partnerships.156 It is difficult to apply these rules
to the newer FIP as they often conflict with more recent laws. For example,
under the 2003 rules, any investment or Venture Capital FIP requires
approval from multiple central authorities–directly at odds with FIP
regulations.157 The Enterprise Provisions also prohibit numerous practices
favored by foreign investors, such as borrowing to make investments, high
capital contribution requirements (again, contravening the subsequent FIP
regulations), and structuring limitations that increase tax burdens for foreign
investors.158 These contradictions will continue to deter investors from
utilizing FIPs for equity investments.
152
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Yet even with these obstacles, foreign investors have increasingly
utilized FIPs for private equity investments.159 This would seem to indicate
strong demand from foreign investors for the ability to use FIPs for equity
investment. By channeling that demand into detailed regulations for this
specific category of foreign direct investment, China could provide a
limited, yet robust, sector for FIPs.
China should amend FIP regulations in order to provide the clarity
necessary for equity-investment FIPs to flourish. A transitioning Chinese
government could limit the promulgation of regulatory detail to this specific
category of foreign direct investment, preventing the type of change that
would impact other foreign investment enterprises and potentially disrupt
existing foreign direct investment regulations and investments.
China should accomplish this by first indicating that it will make the
necessary adjustments to ensure that FIPs are a viable platform for equity
investment. Practitioners are hopeful that the Chinese government will take
an important step by issuing detailed regulations on how an FIP can convert
its capital into Chinese currency for equity investment.160 The absence of a
clear mechanism for conversion of FIP capital into Chinese currency limits
the ability of FIPs to serve as an equity investment vehicle.161 This initial
step could either be accompanied or followed by detailed regulations that
allow foreign investors to utilize FIPs for equity investments. Other
necessary regulations include detail regarding the tax treatment of individual
partners, the tax treatment of various enterprise incomes, the availability of
tax benefits for certain favored industries, and taxes on company FIP
partners.162
This limited development of regulatory specificity for implementation
would provide a viable investment platform for foreign investors while
limiting the institutional support necessary from central and local
governments–equity investment could function as an incubator for FIPs.
Limiting detailed implementing regulations to these investment-minded
FIPs, would prevent an upset of the delicate balance between other foreign
investment enterprises for foreign investors, who would not have the option
of taking more traditional investments and categorizing them as investment
funds. Finally, China could also maintain centralized control for this
159
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particular FIP, as it does in the 2003 Venture Capital Rules, which is critical
to achieving the aforementioned prerequisites to effective policy formation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While China has made a remarkable amount of progress in opening
the country to foreign direct investment and creating a legal system
amenable to foreign entities, there is still progress to be made. FIPs
represent an important, if ultimately uncertain step towards allowing and
encouraging foreign direct investment in China. However, broader use of
FIP by foreign investors will hinge on two factors, as evidenced by the
experience of other foreign direct investment vehicles. These two factors
are detailed implementing regulations and government support.
Detailed implementing regulations and government support for FIP
are both questionable. Implementing regulations are unlikely because of
provisions in FIPs that conflict with the policymaking process in China.
Government support is unlikely because of continued suspicion of the
partnership entity and an ongoing political transition. Until exacting
regulations are promulgated and established, foreign investment through
FIPs will likely be tepid.
Issuance of detailed implementing regulations for FIP equity
investments would help achieve China’s stated interest in reversing
downward foreign direct investment trends. Doing so would preserve the
status quo of other investment enterprises while allowing the creation of a
viable platform for foreign investors that can be later expanded into other
categories more broadly, encouraging the formation of many Guan and Bao
partnerships between foreign and Chinese investors.

